THE
BENEFITS and ADVANTAGES
Gain'd by the late
Septennial PARLIAMENT,
Set in a Clear LIGHT,
BY THEIR
Acts and Deeds.
With a LIST of the
Naturaliz'd Foreigners:
AND
REASONS for Repealing the *Septennial* ACT, and reinforcing *TRIENNIAL PARLIAMENTS*.

By a Member of the late Parliament.

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THE BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE Laſt PARLIAMENT, &c.

AS the Tree is known by its *Fruit*, ſo are Men by their *Works*, which let us into the Knowledge of what *Good* or *Evil* they have done in their reſpective Stations. Both of theſe ought to be handed down to Poſterity, for the Advantage of thoſe that come after Us: The firſt by way of *Precept* and *Example*, to perſuade and invite to its adorable Imitation; and the laſt by way of Dehortation and Diſlike, that ſucceeding Generations may have in abhorrence, and avoid the Miſchiefs that have been done, or intended to be done to them, by their worthleſs Predeceſſors: Which of theſe two Tasks is made choice of by me, the Reader will eaſily judge, by a curſory Glance at the Title of this little Pamphlet; wherein it is deſigned to prefer Matters

of Fact before thoſe of Speculation and Conjecture. Let it ſuffice then, that the Relations I am now ſubmitting to the Peruſal of the Publick, are ſuch as will abide the *Touchſtone* of *Truth*; and that whatſoever Partiality may be imputed to me, through the blind Obſtinacy of Men, who will neither lend a favourable Ear nor Eye to what is diſagreeable to their reſpective Intereſts, I ſhall lean towards no other Byaſs, than what ſhall guide and direct me to thoſe laudable Paths, wherein all, that have at Heart the Welfare of our moſt Excellent Conſtitution in *Church* and *State*, find themſelves obliged to tread. I have been both an Ear and an Eye-witneſs of what has been tranſacted by one Part of the Legiſlative Body of the Nation more than Twenty One Years; and though I am firmly reſolved to retreat, in my own Perſon, from all publick Buſineſs, through the Infirmities of a crazy Conſtitution, and an advanced Age, hold myſelf obliged to do what in me lies towards the *Repreſentation* of the *Third* Eſtate of this Realm (whereof I ſhall ſtill glory in being a Member) by Gentlemen, that will poſtpone their own to the publick Intereſt.

In order to this, it will not be improper to review (after as ſuccinct a manner as the Nature of this Undertaking will allow) the Steps and Methods that were taken and made uſe of by the Parliament preceding this, that is now under Election; and from thence to infer, how much it will tend to our common Safety, and the Preſervation of our Religious Rights and Civil Liberties, if we ſhall delegate the Power the Laws have inveſted the Commons of *Great Britain* with, to thoſe who were intruſted with it before; or if it ſhall be more conducive to the

the Honour, Eaſe, and Tranquillity of the Nation, to chuſe new Deputies, who, as Guardians of the Peoples Properties and Immunities, will redreſs their Grievances, and prevent any Encroachments on their Rights and Liberties.

Nor can any thing be more adapted to Enquiries of ſuch a Nature, or conſiſt better with a right Information, whereby we may be led into a true Knowledge of the Merits of our late Repreſentatives, than the abovementioned Retroſpection, which ſhall be carried on by me with all the Candour and Impartiality that is needful to be made uſe on ſuch an Emergency. I ſhall therefore look back no further than his Preſent Majeſty's Proclamation for calling this laſt Parliament, which he was moſt *graciouſly* pleaſed to iſſue out, before their Predeceſſors, choſen by the late Queen, of *Glorious Memory*, who had ſettled the Revenue, had ended their Seſſions; and give the very words of it at length, that the Reader may judge, after he has ſeen the Reſult of their Conſultations, in the *Titles* of the *Acts* that are in force thereby, how dutifully the ſaid worthy Members have come up to the Tenour of it, which runs thus.

A PROCLAMATION *for Calling a New Parliament.*

'*GEORGE* R.

'IT having pleaſed Almighty God, by moſt 'remarkable Steps of his Providence, to 'bring Us in Safety to the Crown of this 'Kingdom, notwithſtanding the Deſigns of 'evil Men, who ſhewed themſelves diſaffected 'to our Succeſſion; and who have, ſince, with 'the utmoſt Degree of Malice, miſrepreſented

'our firm Reſolution, and uniform Endea-
'vours, to preſerve and defend our moſt Ex-
'cellent Conſtitution both in Church and State;
'and attempted, by many falſe Suggeſtions, to
'render Us ſuſpected to our People: We can-
'not omit, on this Occaſion, of *firſt* ſummon-
'ing our Parliament of *Great Britain* (in Juſ-
'tice to ourſelves, and that the Miſcarriages of
'others may not be imputed to us, at a time,
'when falſe Impreſſions may do the greateſt and
'irrecoverable Hurt before they can be cleared
'up) to ſignify to our whole Kingdom, that
'We were very much concerned, on our Ac-
'ceſſion to the Throne, to find the publick
'Affairs of our Kingdom under the greateſt
'Difficulties, as well in reſpect of our *Trade*,
'and the Interruption of our *Navigation*, as of
'the great Debts of the Nation, which we
'were ſurprized to obſerve had been very much
'increaſed ſince the Concluſion of the laſt
'War. We do not therefore doubt, that, if
'the enſuing Elections ſhall be made by our
'*Loving* Subjects, with that *Safety* and *Freedom*
'which by *Law* they are entitled to, and We
'are firmly reſolved to maintain them in; they
'will ſend up to Parliament SUCH PER-
'SONS, to redreſs the preſent Diſorders,
'and to provide for the Peace and Happineſs of
'Our Kingdoms, and the Eaſe of Our People
'for the future; and therein will have *a par-*
'*ticular Regard to ſuch as ſhewed a Firmneſs to*
'*the Proteſtant Succeſſion*, when it was *moſt in*
'*Danger*. We have therefore found it neceſſa-
'ry, as well for the *Cauſes aforeſaid*, as for *other*
'*weighty* Conſiderations concerning Us, and our
'Kingdoms, to call a New Parliament: And
'We do accordingly declare, That, with the

'Advice

'Advice of our Privy Council, We have this 'Day given Order to our Chancellor of *Great* 'Britain to iſſue out Writs in due Form, for 'calling a New Parliament; which Writs are 'to bear Teſt on the 17th of *January*, and to 'be returnable on Thurſday the 17th Day of '*March* next following.

'*Given at our Court at* St. James's, *the* 15*th of* 'January, 1714. *in the Firſt Year of Our* 'Reign.'

In purſuance of this Recommendation from the Throne, Elections were made accordingly, and ſuch Perſons were returned for Repreſentatives of the People of *Great Britain*, as, for the Generality, were entirely in the Intereſt of the *Government*: Which appeared at the Opening of the Seſſion by their Choice of their very Worthy Speaker, Grandſon to the Great Earl of *Northampton*, who has tranſmitted Glory to his Family, by loſing his Life at the Head of the Royal Army, raiſed by the Bleſſed Martyr King *Charles* I. againſt Parricides and Rebels. But as this little Narrative may ſwell into too large a Bulk, by the Recapitulation of the whole Proceedings of a Parliament, which has laſted beyond its accuſtomed Length; ſo, for Brevity-ſake, I ſhall only inſtance in ſuch Bills paſt into Acts, as may ſet the Services of our late Lawgivers in ſuch a *Light*, as may make them *ſhine before Men*, ſo as to ſtand manifeſt to the Eyes of the Publick, who are left at liberty to judge, from the Text, what Comments ought to be made upon it.

And to this Intent we are to find, in the *Tables of the ſeveral Statutes, Publick and Private*, paſſed

paſſed during this Septennial Parliament, among other Acts, theſe worthy of particular Notice, *viz.*

An Act *to explain* the Act made in the Twelfth Year of the Reign of King *William* the Third, intitled, *An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better ſecuring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject.*

An Act for making perpetual an Act of the 7th and 8th Years of his late Majeſty King *William* the Third, intitled, *An Act, that the ſolemn Affirmation and Declaration of the People called* Quakers, *ſhall be accepted, inſtead of an Oath, in the uſual Form:* And for explaining and enforcing the ſaid Act in relation to the Payment of Tythes and Church-Rates; and for appointing the Form of an Affirmation to be taken by the ſaid People called *Quakers*, inſtead of the Oath of Abjuration.

An Act to impower his Majeſty to ſecure and detain ſuch Perſons as his Majeſty ſhall ſuſpect are conſpiring againſt his Perſon and Government.

An Act to prevent Tumults and Riotous Aſſemblies.

An Act for enlarging the Capital Stock and Yearly Fund of the *SOUTH-SEA* Company, and for ſupplying thereby Eight Hundred Twenty Two Thouſand, Thirty Two Pounds, Four Shillings, and Eight Pence, to Publick Uſes; and for raiſing One Hundred Sixty Nine Thouſand Pounds for the like Uſes, by Sale of Annuities, upon divers Encouragements therein mentioned, and for appropriating ſeveral Supplies granted to his Majeſty.

An Act for ſtrengthening the Proteſtant Intereſt in theſe Kingdoms.

An

An Act for continuing an Act of this preſent Seſſion of Parliament, (*viz. the Firſt of the Fifth Parliament of* Great Britain, *continued by Adjournments*, &c.) intitled, *An Act to impower his Majeſty to ſecure and detain ſuch Perſons, as his Majeſty ſhall ſuſpect are conſpiring againſt his Perſon and Government.*

An Act for enlarging the Time of Continuance of Parliaments, appointed by an Act made in the Sixth Year of the Reign of King *William* and Queen *Mary*, intitled, *An Act for the frequent Meeting and Calling of Parliaments.*

An Act to indemnify ſuch Perſons who have acted in Defence of his Majeſty's Perſon and Government, and for the Preſervation of the Publick Peace of theſe Kingdoms, in and about the Time of the late unnatural Rebellion, from vexatious Suits and Proſecutions.

An Act for repealing ſo much of the Act of the Twelfth and Thirteenth of King *William* III. intitled, *An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better ſecuring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject*, as enacts, That no Perſon who ſhall come to the Poſſeſſion of the Crown, ſhall go out of the Dominions of *England*, *Scotland*, or *Ireland*, without Conſent of Parliament.

An Act for the more effectual ſecuring the Peace of the *Highlands* in *Scotland.*

An Act for quieting and eſtabliſhing Corporations.

An Act for puniſhing Mutiny and Deſertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters.

An Act for making forth new Exchequer Bills, not exceeding one Million, at a certain Intereſt; and for lending the ſame to the *South-Sea* Company, at an higher Intereſt, upon *Security* of repay-

paying the ſame, and ſuch high Intereſt into the Exchequer, for Uſes to which the Fund for leſſening the Publick Debts (call'd the ſinking Fund) is applicable; and for circulating and exchanging, upon Demand, the ſaid Bills, at or near the Exchequer.

An Act for better ſecuring certain Powers and Privileges, intended to be granted by his Majeſty by two Charters for Aſſurance of Ships and Merchandizes at Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and for reſtraining ſeveral extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned.

Another Act for puniſhing Mutiny and Deſertion, and the better Payment of the Army, and their Quarters.

An Act for raiſing a Sum, not exceeding Five Hundred Thouſand Pounds, by charging Annuities at the Rate of Five Pounds *per Cent. per Ann.* upon the Civil Liſt Revenues, till redeemed by the Crown; and for enabling his Majeſty, his Heirs, or Succeſſors, (by cauſing ſuch a Deduction to be made, as therein is mentioned) to make good to the Civil Liſt the Payments which ſhall have been made upon the ſaid Annuities; and for borrowing Money upon a certain Lottery; and for diſcharging the Corporations for Aſſurances of Part of the Money, which they were obliged to pay to his Majeſty, and for making good a Deficiency to the *India* Company.

An Act to repeal ſuch Clauſes in the Quarentine Act, paſſed in the Seventh Seſſion, relating to the Plague, as give Power to remove Perſons from their Habitations.

An Act for granting the *Quakers* ſuch Forms of Affirmation, as may remove the Difficulties many of them lie under.

An

An Act for paying off and cancelling a Million of Exchequer Bills, and for iſſuing a further Sum in new Exchequer Bills.

Naturalization Acts.

Seſſion I.

An Act for naturalizing *Henry Corneliſen.*

An Act for the Naturalization of *Frederick Guliker.*

An Act for naturalizing *Gerard Roeters.*

An Act for naturalizing ERENGARD MELOSINE, *Baroneſs of* Schulenburgh.

Seſſion II.

An Act for naturalizing *Iſaac Kuyckvan Mierop.*

An Act to naturalize *John Jacob Heldt, Theodore Van Rheden,* and *others.*

Seſſion III.

An Act to naturalize *Peter Roſe,* and *others.*

An Act to naturalize *Martin Ludolph, Ulrick Janſen, John Ludolph Spellerburg, John Spieker,* and *Laurence Gundeloah.*

Seſſion IV.

An Act to naturalize *Peter Sejourne, Samuel Dufreſnay,* and *Peter Lucas.*

An Act for naturalizing *Ludowick Chriſtian Sprogell.*

An Act to naturalize *Peter Lamy de Hame,* and *Charlotte Whetſtone.*

Seſſion V.

An Act for the Naturalization of *Mary Sophia Charlotte,* Viſcounteſs HOWE, Wife of *Scroop* Lord Viſcount *Howe* of the Kingdom of *Ireland.*

An Act for naturalizing *Gerard Van Neck.*

An Act for naturalizing *Bennet Eraſmus Hopſer.*

An Act for naturalizing *John Backer*, and *George Kruger.*

An Act for naturalizing *Samuel Gampert.*

An Act for naturalizing *Cornelius Backer*, and *Henry de Putter.*

An Act for naturalizing *Francis Van Hemert*, *John Van Hemert*, *Frederick Morgan*, and *Henry Nicholas Sander.*

An Act for naturalizing *John Henry Grutzman.*

An Act for naturalizing *Philip Germain*, and *George Hollmans.*

Seſſion VI.

An Act for naturalizing *John Robethon*, and *George Robethon* his Son.

An Act to naturalize *Joachim Peterſſen*, *Henry Muilman*, *Benedict Corp*, and *John Henry Ott.*

An Act for the Naturalization of *Iſabella*, Counteſs of *Denbigh*, Wife of *William* Earl of *Denbigh.*

An Act for naturalizing *John Hartcup.*

An Act for naturalizing *Gilbert de Flines*, *Chriſtian Frederick Zincke*, and others.

An Act for naturalizing *James Maſſe*, and *Jacob Stolck.*

An Act for naturalizing *John de Neufville.*

An Act for naturalizing *John Frederick Jales.*

Seſſion VII. & VIII.

An Act for naturalizing *Chriſtopher Schele.*

An Act to naturalize *James Giradot*, and *Paul Amſink.*

An Act to naturalize *John Blyderſteyn.*

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The Reſult of the moſt important Conſultations of our late Repreſentatives being thus laid down, before ſuch as are now under the ſtrongeſt Solicitations of Promiſes, Money, *&c.* they are at liberty either to reject or re-chuſe them, as their Inclinations to unlawful Gain, or the inviolate Attachment they are under a Neceſſity of being to the Love of their dear Country, ſhall prompt and direct them. For we that are Electors, have no other Buſineſs in hand, than, if the above-mentioned Acts have been ſuch as are conducive to the Well-being and Advantage of the Nation, to ſurvey the Liſts of thoſe that promoted them, and to do our Endeavour to ſend them up again to aſſiſt in the Supreme Council of *Great-Britain*; or if on the contrary, (which I ſhall not be ſo preſumptuous to aver) any of *them* ſhall appear deſtructive of our common Happineſs, 'tis then likewiſe in their Option, nay more, in their Duty, as *Engliſhmen*, as Chriſtians, as Men that have in abhorrence all Practices inconſiſtent with the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, and the Liberty of the Subject, to fill their vacant Places with Gentlemen of better Principles, and of greater Zeal and Affection to our *yet* moſt excellent Conſtitution in Church and State; that they, in conjunction with ſuch old Members as are our *Bromleys*, our *Packingtons*, our *Snells*, *Shippens*, &c. that made, and ſtill will make a Stand againſt all Invaſions of the Rights of the People, which they were, and 'tis to be hoped will be ſent up again to aſſert and defend.

'For it is of the laſt Importance to the Electors 'of *Great-Britain*, who have at Heart the Good 'of themſelves, and their Fellow-Subjects, to be 'throughly informed of the Characters of thoſe 'in whom they ſhall think fit to repoſe the

'highest Truſt. Since, if a Majority of improper Perſons ſhould be returned for the enſuing Parliament, the *Britiſh* Liberties may be endangered, and the little Advantages which ſome Electors may gain by giving their Votes, will be a poor and ſorry Recompence for that inexpreſſible Ruin towards which they contribute. The Bible is in all their Hands, and they wou'd do well to read and conſider the Story of that Arch-Traytor *Judas*, who, in deep Remorſe and Deſpair, return'd the Price of his Treachery, and became afterwards his own Executioner.

This is the Senſe of a late Author, who having jumped into the very Opinion I had conceived before the ſight of his Paper, that came out the very day on which the laſt Parliament was diſmiſſed, is to be preferr'd, *multis Intervallis & Paraſangis*, for the Force of his Perſuaſion, the Purity of his Diction, and the Delicacy of his Wit, before moſt that appear in Print upon theſe or the like Occaſions; eſpecially to *ME*, who am worn out like an old Veteran, and like *Priam* in Defence of himſelf againſt the Invaders of his Kingdom and Country, can only ſhew my Courage, without Strength ſufficient to diſcover my Power—*Telumque imbelle ſine Ictu—conjicit*—The moſt beautiful Deſcription of the Impotency of old Age, that can be ſhewn in the Writings of any Author antient or modern, but the Prince of Poets, the great and immortal *Virgil*.

The Writer above-mentioned has anticipated me, by ſaying, 'There are many Heads on which 'Electors for Members to ſerve in Parliament, 'may interrogate their Candidates, but none, 'he thinks, of greater Importance, than their O-'pinion, as to their Reſolutions, when choſen, of

'making

'making the ſtricteſt Inquiry into the Applica-
'tion of the Publick Money; and particularly
'the *Two Hundred and Fifty Thouſand Pounds*,
'granted, ſome Years ſince, for ending the War
'in the *North*; the Cauſes of the Deficiency of
'about Eight Hundred Thouſand Pounds of the
'Liſt, already ſupplied by Parliament; and ſuch
'farther Deficiencies as may hereafter come be-
'fore them. The Reaſons why the Debt of the
'Army, which was at firſt eſtimated at under
'Four Hundred Thouſand Pounds, has ſwell'd
'to above *Two Millions*, whereof *Twelve Hundred*
'*Thouſand Pounds* has been certified to *Foreigners*;
'and who ſhall not propoſe likewiſe ſtrictly to
'enquire into the *Advantages* ariſing to *Great*
'*Britain* by the *Baltick* and *Mediterranean* Squa-
'drons, whereby the Expences of the Navy
'have been extended more than *Three Millions*
'*Sterling*, over and above what had been neceſ-
'ſary in a Time of Peace, computing according
'to the Eſtabliſhment for the preſent Year;
'ought never to have any honeſt Elector's Vote,
'nor ever ſhall have mine.'

It will likewiſe deſerve the Curioſity of ſuch as are applied to for their Voices, to know who were for and againſt the fatal *South-Sea Scheme*, and the *Two Inſurances*, in the ſeveral Steps which the ſame took in the Houſe of Commons: Who were *For* and *Againſt* ſome other Laws that have paſſed, or been attempted, for trying Crimes out of the Counties where the ſame were committed: Who were *For* and *Againſt* the *Peerage-Bill*, the *Suſpenſion* of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, the Subſidy granted for the Uſe of the preſent King of *Sweden*, and allowing ſo great a Standing-Army in time of Peace? Who ere *For* and *Againſt* regulating, that is, for ſuppreſſing

preſſing Charity-Schools, thoſe celebrated Nurſeries of young Children, in the Doctrines of the Church by Law Eſtabliſhed? And who *For* and *Againſt* ſetting aſide Select Veſtries? Who *For* and *Againſt* eſtabliſhing Military Law in a time of Peace, when that Matter was fully debated ſome Years paſt, in a very numerous, if not the fulleſt Houſe of Commons, which hath been during the laſt Parliament? Who were of the 115, who voted for bringing in a Bill for repealing part of the laſt Year's *Quarentine* Act, and the 75 that oppoſed the ſame? Who were of the 61 that were for reporting the Bill relating to the *Freedom of Elections*, and the 30 that were againſt the making of that Report? Who were of the 142, who aſſerted the Right of the Commons of *Great Britain*, to examine, in the moſt ſolemn manner; and the 144 who oppoſed the ſame? Who were of the 128, who, in conſequence of that Reſolution, acquitted B— *P*—— and the 124 who were of Opinion, that the Charge againſt him had been made good?

Theſe, and many other Particulars, the Electors have in their power; which, 'tis hoped, they will exert, to examine their Candidates about; and according as their Conduct has been agreeable or diſagreeable, in theſe or any other Matters, it is incumbent upon them to determine themſelves in their future Choice.

But above all Queſtions that can be put to them, their Opinion, in relation to the Act for Septennial Parliaments, ought to be the chief, from the Greatneſs of its Importance. I know ſome Gentlemen, who came into that Law, & heartily repent thereof, and think (as I in my Conſcience do) that it has been attended with

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very ill Conſequences; and I am firmly reſolved not to give my Voice, in thoſe Places where I have a Right to do it, to any Gentleman, who ſhall not previouſly declare his Agreement with me, as to this Matter, and give his ſincere Promiſe to uſe his utmoſt Endeavour to re-eſtabliſh *Triennial* Parliaments, by which the Conſtitution of Parliaments was brought much nearer to what it originally was; and I am fully perſuaded, that thoſe, who are unwilling to come into ſuch a Promiſe, will be very eaſily induced to add *Eight*, or any other Number of Years, to the further Continuance of the enſuing Parliament.

This brings me to the laſt Part of what I propoſed to treat of in the Title of this little Pamphlet, wherein I am to give my Reaſons for repealing the Septennial Act, and re-enacting that for Triennial Parliaments in its room; which Reaſons are offered to the Conſideration of the Publick, after the following manner.

Sublatâ Cauſâ tollitur Effectus, is an Axiom as old as Reaſon itſelf, and now the chief Argument of Parliaments Exiſtence for Seven Years is actually expired, by the Death of the late Inſurrection, and the Deſtruction and Flight of thoſe that ſet it on foot: And now *the reſtleſs and Popiſh Faction* are ſuppreſſed from any *longer deſigning and endeavouring to renew the Rebellion within this Kingdom, and an Invaſion from Abroad, deſtructive to the Peace and the Security of the Government*; we have no room to doubt, but, *as it is appointed for all Men once to die*, thoſe whom the People have delegated their Repreſentative Authority to, are *demiſed*, that we may again *ſeek the old Ways and find them*, and have it in our power to return to what is the very Eſſence

of

of our CONSTITUTION, by a new Choice of ſuch Perſons, as may, with Juſtice, be deemed as fit to be the *Conſervators of the Peoples Liberties*, as thoſe who were lately ſitting.

For that is the Truſt of the Members ſent up to Parliament, who are to ſupport us in our juſt Rights, and redreſs our Grievances; and for that end are they called to meet together, from the Throne, to conſult about the arduous Affairs of the Kingdom.

'*Standing Armies* and *Standing Parliaments* are 'equally inconſiſtent with the Nature of a Free 'State: The firſt may endanger its Liberties, 'even after they have been found neceſſary to 'be raiſed for their Preſervation; and the laſt 'eſtabliſh a Grievance, by taking away a Re-'medy, *by always ſtagnating*; (*ſo ſays* Juſtian John-'ſon, *the famous Whig-Writer.*) Whereas fre-'quent Elections of Members to repreſent the 'Third Eſtate of the Kingdom, are attended 'with great Conveniences; the chief of which 'are, (1.) That they ſhew the Sovereign's en-'tire Reliance on the Affections of his Subjects, 'without which no King can be either ſafe or 'eaſy. (2.) They ſupport the Conſtitution, 'by preventing Encroachments, either of Parlia-'ments on the Crown, or of the Crown on the 'Rights and Liberties of the People. (3.) They 'correct Abuſes and Exorbitances committed 'through the Ambition and Avarice of Mini-'ſters. (4.) They give the People an Oppor-'tunity, who have an indiſputable Right to it, 'of remedying any Abuſes that may be com-'mitted by their Repreſentatives, chuſing o-'thers that ſhall be more faithful in the Diſ-'charge of the Truſt repoſed in them.'

But

But frequent Elections occaſion ruinous Expences (*ſays an Oppoſer*) and raiſe great Ferments, and cauſe Animoſities which are of dangerous Conſequence; to which it is replyed, that Expences at Elections are voluntary, and that Bills for *long Parliaments* are ſo far from preventing Corruptions, that they rather encreaſe them; for the longer a Parliament is to ſit, the more valuable to be purchas'd is a Station in it, and the greater alſo is the Danger of corrupting the Members of it: For, if there ſhould be a Miniſtry, who ſhould want a Parliament to *ſcreen* them from the juſt Reſentment of the People, or from a Diſcovery of their ill Practices to the King, who cannot be otherwiſe, or ſo truly informed of them, as by a free Parliament: It would be ſo much the Intereſt of ſuch a Miniſtry to influence the Elections (which by their Authority, and the Diſpoſal of the Publick Money, they of all others have the beſt Means of doing) that 'tis to be feared they will be tempted, and not fail to make Uſe of them: And even when the Members are choſen, they have a greater Opportunity of inducing very many to comply with them, than they could have, if not only the Seſſion of Parliament, but the Parliament it ſelf were reduced to the antient and primitive Conſtitution and Practice of frequent and new Parliaments; for as a good Miniſtry will neither practice nor need Corruption, ſo it ought not to be any one's Intent to provide for the Security of a bad one.

The Commons aſſembled in Parliament have no Legiſlative Capacity but what is abſolutely, is

ſolely in their Electors, and is derived from them; their Truſt from the Sixth of King *William* and Queen *Mary*, 'till the Time of repealing that Clauſe, which was alleg'd to be done in a Time of moſt imminent Danger, was a Triennial Truſt, and if made ſo again would cauſe it to revert to its legal Duration. This Law was one of the Fruits of the Revolution; this Law reſtored the Freedom and Frequency of Parliaments, ſo far as it was conſiſtent with the Circumſtances of that Reign, which was involved in a War, and had Occaſion for conſtant and heavy Taxes; this Law was a Conceſſion made to the People by King *William*, in the midſt of his Difficulties, and no Doubt will upon Application to his Majeſty, by both Houſes of Parliament, be again permitted to be in Force again; for ſince his Majeſty has been pleaſed to propoſe that Prince as a Pattern to himſelf, and is purſuing his Steps with ſo much Glory, it would be Matter of Aſtoniſhment to ſee that in the Reign of the one King every Thing ſhould be done to enlarge the Liberties of the People, and to reſtrain his Succeſſors from being capable of relapſing into the Errors and Abuſes of former Princes; and in the Reign of the other, now all Tumults are appeaſed, and Affairs run ſmoothly on, there ſhould be the leaſt Appearance of doing any Thing which might ſeem to ſtretch the Prerogative, to invade and ſhock the Rights and Privileges of the Subject, when both ſhall be found to rule by the ſame Principles of Liberty, and by the ſame Maxims of Government.

The Triennial Act is grounded on the antient Uſage and Conſtitution of Parliaments, as it is intended to oblige the Crown to call them frequently,

ly. For that Parliaments were held frequently, (half Yearly, or annually at leaſt) appears not only from the beſt Accounts we have of the firſt Inſtitution of them, and by the Two Acts of *Edward* III. but by the Writs of Summons ſtill extant, and by ſeveral Authentick Inſtruments and Records. But to avoid Tediouſneſs, I ſhall only mention Two Records. One is the famous Inſtrument of *Edward* I. concerning the *Annuus Cenſus*, Yearly Offering, then claim'd by the Popes from the Crown of *England*; wherein he takes Notice, that ſome Arrears incurred on that Head, had not been raiſed, as they ought to have been *in Parliamento, quod circa Octavas Reſurrectionis Dominica celebrari in Anglia conſuevit, in Parliament which was us'd to be held about every Eaſter-Tide.* But he promiſes that he will recommend the Payment of the Money due, *in alio Parliamento noſtro, quod ad Finem Sancti Micharolis proxime intendimus dante Domino celebrare, in another of our Parliaments, which we intend by God's Leave to hold at Michaelmas next.* The other Record is a Repreſentation of the Parliament to King *Richard* II. ſome Paſſages of which are theſe, *Quod ex Antiquo Statuto habent, & Conſuetudine laudabili & approbata cujus Contrarietate dici non volebit*, viz. *Which they have from an antient Statute, and from approved and laudable Cuſtom*, which his Majeſty will not ſpeak in Violation of That the King is to call *Dominos & Proceret Regni, atque Communes ſemel in Anno ad Parliamentum ſuum, tanquam ad ſummam Curiam totius Regni, the Lords and Peers of the Kingdom, as alſo the Commons once every Year to ſit in his Parliament, as the ſupream Court of his whole Kingdoms.* That if the King *a Parliamento ſuo ſe alienaverit ſua Sponti, non aliqua Infirmitate, aut aliqua alia de Cauſa Neceſſitatis, ſed par immo-*

deratam Voluntatem proterve ſe ſubſtraxerit per Abſentiam Temporis Quadraquinginta Dierum, tanquam de Vexatione Populis ſui & gravibus expenſis eorum non curans, ex tunc licitum & omnibus & ſingulis eorum abſque Domigenio Regis redire ad propria, & unicuique eorum in Patriam ſuam remeare. That if the King ſhall alienate himſelf from his Parliament of his own Accord, not by Reaſon of any Indiſpoſition, or any other Cauſe of Neceſſity, but out of his own abſolute Will ſhall peeviſhly abſent himſelf from them for the Space of Forty Days, as if taking no Care of the Grievances of his People, and the Expences they are put to, from thence it ſhall be lawful for all and every of them, with Leave from the King to return to their own proper Habitations, and for all of them to a Man to go back to the Place of his Reſidence.

From the former of theſe Records, 'tis natural to obſerve, that *Edward* I. (who was one of our beſt Princes, and ſo great a Preſerver of the Laws of his Kingdom, that he is with great Juſtice call'd by our Hiſtorians, the *Engliſh Juſtinian*) choſe rather than to prolong the ſitting of his Parliament beyond their uſual Time, to diſſolve One, though it had not finiſh'd its neceſſary Buſineſs, and to ſummon another within the ſpace of a few Months.

From the latter 'tis very remarkable that *Richard* II. (who is ſaid to be one of the *worſt* Kings that ever ſate on the Throne of *England*) by abſenting himſelf from the Buſineſs of Parliament, and by that Means continuing their Seſſions beyond their proper and accuſtom'd Time, drew upon himſelf a ſharp Remonſtrance from both Houſes, and was, at laſt for ſuch Practices, amongſt other Things, depoſed.

Many

Many Reigns after this, *Henry* VIII. accompliſh'd what *Richard* II. only attempted, and he continued his laſt Parliament, *ad libitum*, without Reproof, by enlarging the Prerogatives, and perſwading the Members thereof to give him the Abby-Lands, under pretence that they would bear part of his Expences, which would eaſe them of Taxes, and improve Trade: Whereupon, ſoon after he demanded and obtained great Subſidies, and made uſe of thoſe Lands to enſlave the Nation: But God forbid we ſhould have any Reſemblance of thoſe Times; for that Parliament acted like Slaves, and that King acted like a Tyrant. But if the Triennial Act had not been grounded on the Reaſons of Antiquity, and the original Uſage of Parliaments, it was no more than a reaſonable Indulgence from the Throne to the People, who had ſtruggled for a Revolution, on account of the Abuſes of Parliaments, and the Endeavours to render them inſignificant. 'Tis true that King *William* who gave a Sanction to it by his Royal Aſſent, once denied it: But, afterwards, he conſider'd, that it could be no Diminution of his Prerogative, no Blemiſh to his Regal Power, to retrieve the Honour and Dignity of Parliaments, as they were his Support, as they were the eſſential Part of that Conſtitution he came to ſave; and this he found he could only do by the frequent calling of them.

Beſides, this Law was not only a reaſonable Indulgence to the People, as hath been ſaid, in that it gave them frequent Opportunities of changing their Members, when they did not approve their Behaviour, and was of Advantage to the Publick, in

in making them act with more than ordinary Caution and Circumſpection; but it proved of great Service to the Crown; for by frequent Parliaments the Crown could only know the immediate Senſe of the Nation, which is abſolutely neceſſary for a Prince to be appriz'd of on all Emergencies. However inconvenient this Law may have been lately thought, when it was repealed to the Crown; and however oppoſite to ſome Schemes then in View, Men of Experience cannot think or imagine that the Crown could have got half the Money it hath been ſupplied with ſince the Revolution, but by freſh and new Elections: Such grievous and perpetual Taxes would never have been endured and complyed with by a State and continued Parliament; there is no Injury or Diſhonour therefore to the Crown, to be obliged, by a Law, to do what in Juſtice to the Subject, and Convenience to it ſelf it ought to do without it.

But if this Law for Triennial Parliaments is to continue repeal'd, the People will be in a worſe Condition, than before it was granted to them. They will be bound up for ever in a Legiſlative Way, the only Way effectually and irrecoverably to loſe their Liberties. They will by their Repreſentations, under a Seven Years Reſtriction from a freſh Choice, condemn ſhort and frequent Parliaments, and eſtabliſh long, and perhaps *penſion'd* Ones, which is a new Doctrine, and ſuch as was never before advanced by the Commons of *Great Britain*.

The laſt Reaſon made Uſe of by the Promulgers of the Law, for *enlarging the Time for Continuance*

Continuance of Parliaments, appointed by an Act *for the frequent Meeting of Parliaments*, to prove the Neceſſity of it was, that it would enable the Government the better to treat and negociate *Foreign Alliances*. But ſurely thoſe who are againſt its being repeal'd, and abide by this Argument, are Strangers to the Conſtitution of *England*: For by the known and ſtanding Law of the Land, the Right of making Peace and War, Treaties, and Alliances, are undeniably, the King's Prerogative, and his Majeſty may exerciſe that Right, as to him ſeems beſt, and moſt for the Benefit of his People, without Application to Parliament, either to approve or confirm. But admitting that of late Years, Parliaments have thought Themſelves entitled to interpoſe their Advice in Treaties and Alliances, (though I deny it to be their Right) this is an Argument ſingly ſufficient to ſupport the Triennial Bill. For ſuppoſing a Miniſtry ſhall at any Time, negotiate an Alliance prejudicial to the Intereſt of *England*, and by their Artifice impoſe upon a Parliament to approve and confirm it; is it not a peculiar Happineſs, that ſuch a Parliament will quickly have an End: And that the People will have it in their Power, by another, which muſt, when the Triennial Act ſhall come in Force again, ſoon be called to correct the Miſdeeds of ſuch a Miniſtry, and prevent the further ill Conſequences of ſuch a Treaty to the Nation.

The Right of electing Members to repreſent Us in Parliament, is inſeperably inherent in the People of *Great Britain*, and can never be thought to be delegated to the Repreſentatives, unleſs the elected can be made the Elector; and at the ſame

ſame Time if we ſuppoſe it the Will of the People, that their Repreſentatives ſhould have it in their Power to deſtroy thoſe that made them, whenever a M——— ſhall think it neceſſary to *ſcreen* themſelves from their juſt Reſentment: This would be to deſtroy the Fence to all their Freedom: For if future Parliaments ſhall have a Right to continue themſelves one Year, one Month, or Day, beyond their ſtated Time, 'twill unavoidably follow, they will have it in their Power to make themſelves perpetual; and whatever Neceſſity we may be reduced to hereafter, Matters are not yet apparently in that bad Condition; to convince the People that if there once has been an Occaſion for breaking in upon their Conſtitution (and that to me is none of the moſt manifeſt) that it is ſtill conducive to our Peace and Security, to lay faſt hold of it, for the Government after the Suppreſſion of the Rebellion, is ſo much better guarded againſt Riots and Tumultuous Aſſemblies, by the wholeſome Laws provided by the Wiſdom of this Parliament, that little or no Danger can be apprehended from thence; eſpecially if we conſider the Number of Forces prudently quarter'd throughout the Kingdom, ſufficient to ſuppreſs the moſt daring Commotions that ſhall be attempted.

As for the Animoſities and Diviſions rais'd by Elections, they are of a private Nature, and little affect the Publick; thoſe that do are otherwiſe to be accounted for, and might have been extinguiſh'd; but the Opportunities have been neglected, and it were to be wiſh'd that ſome *Perſons* have not ſtudied rather to continue and increaſe them, than to extinguiſh them. To

ſpeak

ſpeak plainly on this Occaſion, the greateſt *Animoſities* and *Diviſions*, the greateſt Diſcontents and Uneaſineſſes here among us have been owing to the unreaſonable Reſentments, Avarice and Ambition of ſome, and to the unaccountable Folly and Madneſs of others.

That our Enemies will take Advantage of our Diviſions (another Argument us'd by the Sticklers for the *Continuance Bill*) is not to be doubted, if it is in their Power, but how can it, we have now no Enemies to fear, being now at Peace with all Nations; and our Malecontents at Home are ſo few, that they are rather to be pitied and deſpiſed than dreaded: But, here it muſt be obſerved, that ſince the Triennial Act took Place, there have been Ten ſeveral Parliaments called, moſt of them, nay almoſt all, when we were actually in War Abroad, our Animoſities and Diviſions great at Home, and our Enemies vigilant, yet no Inconveniences follow'd, nor were any ſo much as attempted at thoſe Elections.

Since therefore all the Arguments for the abovenamed Act of Continuance of *Parliaments*, are now of no Force as to pleading a Neceſſity for it, ſince there remains no further Reaſon for its future Subſiſtance, ſince all the Intents of it have been fully anſwer'd, it is but fitting that we return to frequent and new Parliaments, which are our Conſtitution, becauſe long Parliaments are plainly deſtructive of the Subjects juſt Rights, and many Ways inconſiſtent with the Good of the Nation: For, can it be reaſonable that any Particular Men ſhould for a long Time engroſs ſo great a Truſt excluſive of others? Can it be of

Advantage to the Publick, that the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs ſhould be long confined to thoſe they have once choſen, their Intereſts admitting of great Variation in length of Time.

Frequent and new Parliaments, as it has been urged before, are our Conſtitution, the very Soul of all our Liberties and Immunities, and the Calling and Holding of them has been for many Ages, the Practice. Before the Conqueſt Parliaments were held Three Times every Year, at *Chriſtmas*, *Eaſter*, and *Whitſuntide*; this muſt be underſtood of new Parliaments, for Prerogations and long Adjournments were not then known, they were never heard of 'till latter Days.

They began in *Henry* the VIII's Time, that Prince and his Miniſters knowing long Parliaments were beſt fitted, to make great Changes. They were therefore Inventions, when extraordinary Things were to be done; it was then the Church was to be alter'd, and the Church Lands (as has been intimated before) to be taken away. From that Time our Hiſtories tell us, that when ever the ſame Parliaments were long continued, or the Meetings of Parliaments long diſcontinued, they gave great Uneaſineſs. In the unfortunate Reign of King *Charles* I. there had been an Intermiſſion of Parliaments Twelve Years, which produced an Act in the 16th Year of that King, *For the preventing the Inconveniences happening by long Intermiſſion of Parliaments.* That Act in the Preamble recites the Law made in the Reign of *Edward* the III. *viz.* 'That Parliaments 'ought to be held every Year Once: But that 'the Appointment of Time and Place, belong'd 'to

'to his Majeſty, and his Royal Progenitors: 'And that it had been found by Experience, 'great Inconveniencies and Miſchiefs had hap-'pen'd to the King, and to the Commonwealth, 'by not holding Parliaments accordingly; and 'for Prevention of the like for the Future, it 'enacts, *That the ſaid Laws ſhall be ſtrictly obſerved: 'And that in Caſe there be an Intermiſſion of the 'ſitting of Parliaments for Three Years together, if 'there is a Parliament in being, that Parliament ſhall 'be diſſolved*, and very extravagant Powers were given for the Calling and Aſſembling of another; *and every ſuch Parliament was not to be diſſolv'd of Fifty Days*, without their own Conſent. This extraordinary Step was ſoon follow'd by another, an Act, *That the Parliament ſhould not be diſſolved, prorogued, or adjourned, but by Act of Parliament, nor the Houſes of Parliament adjourned, but by themſelves reſpectively.* I need not be particular in reciting the Conſequences of this Act of Parliament, for every one knows, that ſet of Men, when they had thus continued themſelves, never ſtop'd 'till they had murther'd the beſt of Princes, and entirely ſubverted our Conſtitution both in Church and State.

Soon after the Reſtoration of King *Charles* the Second, the Act *for preventing the Inconveniencies happening by the long Intermiſſion of Parliaments*, was repealed, becauſe deregatory to the Prerogative; and becauſe it might be an Occaſion of many Miſchiefs and Inconveniencies, and endanger the publick Peace and Safety; but at the ſame Time it was declared and enacted, *That becauſe by the Antient Laws and Statutes, Parliaments are to be held very often, the ſitting and holding of Parliaments ſhall not be intermitted above Three Years at the moſt.* This

Law not having been ſo well obſerved as it ought to have been at the Revolution in the Convention Parliament, when it was thought neceſſary to declare the Rights and Liberties of the People, after many Breaches had been made upon them, it was among other Things declared, *That Parliaments ought to be held frequently.* And what follows in that Act, is very ſtrong, for it declares and enacts, *That all and ſingular the Rights and Liberties aſſerted and claimed in the ſaid Declaration, are the indubitable Rights and Liberties of the People of this Kingdom, and ſo ſhall be eſteemed, allowed, and judg'd, and taken to be, and all the Particulars thereof ſhall be firmly and ſtrictly holden and obſerved, as they are expreſs'd in the ſaid Declaration.* The Right claimed and aſſerted, is, that Parliaments ought to be held frequently; and ſoon after a new Parliament was called, which ſate annually: But this was not look'd upon to be a complying with the Right claimed, and therefore, after that Parliament had ſate Three Times in the Fourth Seſſion, it was thought neceſſary to come to a further Explication, a Bill paſſed both Houſes, and was rejected by the Throne, *for the frequent Meeting and calling of Parliaments.* Others were attempted in the next Seſſion, and it is well known how they come to miſcarry in the Houſe of Commons; but in the ſucceeding Seſſion a Bill paſſed both Houſes, and had the Royal Aſſent, that is the Triennial Act which the purpoſe of this Pamphlet is to have re-enacted.

For undoubtedly to protract Parliaments beyond their due Length, is to take away the People's Right of appointing their Repreſentatives. It deprives them of their Share in the Legiſlature, and

and, in my Opinion, Wounds the Conſtitution of Parliaments very deep. No Gentleman but knows that the Frame of our Government is made up of the King, the Lords, and the Commons.

Theſe, with reſpect to each other, have ever been eſteemed ſeperate, although, when put together, they make but one entire Government. The Duration of this Form of Government in *England*, longer than in our Neighbouring Countries, is manifeſtly owing to the Care of thoſe that went before us, in keeping theſe three *Conſtituent Parts* of the Political Body up to the Rules of their firſt Inſtitution, by reſtraining each to its proper Bounds, and in not ſuffering one to be over-born or ſwallow'd up by the other Two. However theſe Three great Parts may, in other Reſpects, be conſider'd, yet in regard to the Legiſlative, they muſt act in Conjunction. The Aſſent of each to the making of Laws is eſſentially neceſſary, but the Manner of giving that Aſſent is different in the People, from what it is in the King, and the Lords. The People by Reaſon of their Number, cannot be perſonally preſent at the paſſing of Laws; their Aſſent cannot otherwiſe be ſignified, than by their Repreſentations. The Diſadvantage the Commons are, in this Reſpect under, is in ſome Sort made up to them by the Care taken in the Framing of our Government, that they ſhould be truly and fairly repreſented.

That Elections ſhall be free is often declared in our written Laws. 'Tis in Effect, ſaying, that neither the Power of the Crown, nor the Power of the Lords ſhould interpoſe in them. The Reſolution

Reſolution of the Houſe of Commons renew'd every Seſſion, *That for a Lord to concern himſelf in the Election of Members to ſerve for the Commons in Parliament is a high Infringement of the Liberties and Privileges of the Commons of* Great-Britain, ſufficiently ſhews the Jealouſy the Commons ever had of the Lords intermedling in the Elections of their Repreſentatives.

The Attempts made on the King's Part towards influencing Elections, have been principally by Officers under the Nomination of the Crown. As this Miſchief from Time to Time appeared, Laws were introduc'd and eſtabliſh'd to provide againſt it. The Statute 7. *Henry* IV. *C.* 15. recites *That Law to be made at the grievous Commons of the undue Elections for Parliament*, and directs (among other Things) That *Sheriffs ſhould proceed to Elections*, freely *and* indifferently, *notwithſtanding any Command to the contrary.* Many ſubſequent Laws were made for preſerving to the People the Privilege (on which all other depend) of being *faithfully* repreſented in Parliament. No leſs than Seven Acts were made in King *William*'s Time for that purpoſe: So greatly did the Endeavours of Officers, to influence Elections at that Time, abound. The Statute of 3. *W.* and *M. C.* 1. takes Notice, *That the Officers of the Exciſe, by Reaſon of the Greatneſs of the Duty, and the extraordinary Powers given them, had frequently, by Threats, or Promiſes, ſo far prevailed on Electors, that they had been actually debarr'd of the* Freedom *of giving their Votes; which, according to the known Conſtitution of this Kingdom, every Perſon ought to have and enjoy.* It then enacts, *That any ſuch Officer, who perſwades or diſſwades any Elector from giving his Vote, ſhall forfeit*

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One Hundred Pounds, and be incapable of exccuting any Office relating to the Exciſe. Another Law of the like Nature was ſome few Years ſince made in Relation to the Officers, concern'd in collecting the Poſt-Office Duty. Theſe Laws will, in all probability be laid aſleep, and the Proviſions made for protecting the People's Right of Election will become inſignificant, if Elections themſelves are defer'd and diſcontinued beyond their appointed Time.

The Care taken by the Founders of the Government to preſerve this RIGHT did not ſtop here: It was not ſufficient to that purpoſe, that Elections ſhould be *free*; it was likewiſe neceſſary that they ſhould be *frequent*. The People's *Right* to *frequent* Elections was founded on ſubſtantial Reaſon: For ſince they (who could act no otherwiſe but by Repreſentatives) were capable of being miſtaken in their Choice, and the Perſon choſen liable to be tempted over to a Dependance on the Crown, or on the Lords, and thereby receive an undue Influence, it became needful that frequent Opportunities ſhould be given to the Commons to correct their Choice, and thereby prevent the Danger which the Unfaithfulneſs of their Repreſentatives might otherwiſe bring upon them.

That the People have a Right to frequent Elections, has been made unqueſtionable before by the beſt of Evidence, perpetual Uſage. It has been already proved, that from the firſt Footſteps of Parliaments, down to the Time of *Hen.* 8. not only from Records, but from the printed Statutes, the *Frequency* of Elections does appear. The moſt

moſt repeated Inſtances within that Period of Time, are of Parliaments determining within the Compaſs of a Year, and no Inſtance can be brought where they continued longer than Three.

King *Charles* I. (that unfortunate Prince) was put upon governing without Parliaments, but the Neceſſity of his Affairs forcing him to change his purpoſe, a Parliament was called in the 16th Year of his Reign, in which a Law of an extraordinary Nature was paſs'd, *viz. That in Caſe the King ſhould not call a Parliament within Three Years after the Determination of the preceeding Parliament, then the Lord Chancellor ſhould iſſue Writs for that Purpoſe.* That Parliament ſoon after *perpetuated* themſelves, ſo far as it was capable of being done, and by an *Act* made the ſame Year, *they were not to be diſſolved but by Act of Parliament.* To the long Continuance of which Parliament were all the Calamities of the Civil War to be imputed.

The Statute of the 16th of K. *Charles* I. was repealed by the Statute of the 16th of K. *Charles* II. *C.* 1. But notwithſtanding the fond Humour the Nation was then in, even by the ſame Act it was declared, *That by the Laws of this Realm, Parliaments are to be held very often; and to the End there might be a* frequent *Calling, Aſſembling, and Holding Parliaments,* once in three Years at leaſt, *it was declared and enacted, that Parliaments ſhould not be intermitted above THREE YEARS at the moſt.*

In the ſame K. *Charles* II's Time, another Turn of Policy was taken, which was to bring the Houſe of Commons to the Bent of the Miniſtry,

by

by the ſecret Application of *Penſions* to the Members: Such was the Modeſty even of that Age, ſo much inveigh'd againſt by a Set of People in the Preſent, as not *openly* and *avowedly* to byaſs with *Offices*, thoſe who ought, at leaſt, to be *faithful Repreſentatives* of the People.

For the effecting this pernicious Purpoſe of corrupting the Commons, it was neceſſary that the Parliament ſhould be prolong'd; which it was, for 18 *Years:* Aſſurance of which being privately given to many of the Members, and there being Time ſufficient to gain upon others, (not ſo far intereſted with the Secret) the Deſign was effected. And ſuch was the Behaviour of that Parliament, that it acquir'd the infamous Name of the *Penſioner-Parliament.*

The Attack thus made on the Conſtitution of Parliaments, by depriving the People of their Right of frequent Elections, gave Birth to the Jealouſy the Nation entertain'd of the Intention that Prince had of aſſuming to himſelf a *Deſpotick* Power. How uneaſy the latter Part of his Reign became on that Account, it is well known: And the Nation felt the Effects of the Ferments and Diviſions which then aroſe; and by the Artifice of ill-deſigning Miniſters, have been ever ſince continu'd.

The People being warned by the narrow Eſcape their Liberties met with in that Parliament, did, (after much Struggle in the Reign before-mention'd) obtain a Law for *Triennial* Parliaments, which has ſince been alter'd into one for *Septennial.*

And now, after above an Hundred and Twenty Millions given by the People, in order to preſerve their old Form of Government, we

may, in all Probability, be expos'd again to the greateſt of Dangers, which is that of a long Parliament, if the ſaid *Septennial* Act, after the Diſſolution of this Parliament, ſhall continue to be in Force.

In the Time of the Penſioner-Parliament, (which began in 1662) the Means of Temptation in the Miniſters Hands, were not ſo great as they now are: The Civil-Liſt is well-nigh double to what it was: The Dependance on the Crown is greatly enlarg'd, by Reaſon of the Increaſe of Officers for managing the publick Revenue and Funds. What Influence theſe may have upon the exhauſted Nation, under the Terror which a great and extraordinary Number of regular Troops carry with them, is eaſy to be foreſeen.

FINIS.